



The Case for a European Union 
Intellectual Property Court 
 
 
Maria José Schmidt-Kessen 
LL.M. Law in a European and Global Context 
Católica Global School of Law 
Universidade Católica Portuguesa Lisbon 
 
Supervised by: 
Miguel Poiares Maduro & Nuno Garoupa 
 
Date: October 15, 2012 
 
Word Count (incl. footonotes): 19 177 




I. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 4 
II. The case for specialized adjudication ........................................................................ 5 
A. Judicial economy ................................................................................................... 8 
1. Exclusive jurisdiction ......................................................................................... 9 
2. Uniform interpretation of a single field of law ................................................ 13 
3. Expertise .......................................................................................................... 16 
B. Supporting instrument of federal policy .............................................................. 19 
1. Internal policy goals ......................................................................................... 20 
2. External policy goals ........................................................................................ 22 
III. The case for specialized adjudication in the field of intellectual property ............ 23 
A. The nature of IP Litigation .................................................................................. 23 
1. IP law ............................................................................................................... 24 
2. The parties ........................................................................................................ 27 
3. The bench ......................................................................................................... 30 
4. Conclusion on the desirability of specialized IP adjudication in light of the 
propositions – A private perspective .................................................................... 33 
B. Implementation of federal IP policy .................................................................... 34 
1. Internal IP policy .............................................................................................. 34 
2. External IP policy ............................................................................................ 37 
3. Conclusion on the desirability of specialized IP adjudication in light of the 
propositions – A public perspective ..................................................................... 39 
IV. The case for specialized European adjudication in the field of intellectual property
 ...................................................................................................................................... 39 
A. The current situation of IP protection in the EU ................................................. 39 
1. Copyright ......................................................................................................... 40 
2. Trademarks and Designs .................................................................................. 41 
3. Patent ................................................................................................................ 43 
B. Inefficiencies in European IP litigation ............................................................... 44 
1. IP litigation under the Brussels I Regulation ................................................... 45 
 3 
2. Litigation in the Community trademark and design courts ............................. 48 
C. European IP policy .............................................................................................. 49 
1. Free trade and competition in the Internal Market ........................................... 49 
2. International trade and international organizations .......................................... 50 
D. Previous proposals for European IP courts ......................................................... 50 
1. Rise and fall (and resurrection?) of the European and European Union Patent 
Court proposal ...................................................................................................... 51 
2. ‘Upgrading’ the OHIM Boards of Appeal to a European trade mark court .... 53 
E. The case for a European Union Intellectual Property Court ............................... 53 
1. Legal basis in the Treaties ................................................................................ 53 
2. The case for a European Union court specialized in IP: an assessment in light 
of the propositions ................................................................................................ 54 
V. Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 56 





The value of intellectual property (IP) has enormously increased in the past decades, 
and with it the number of disputes involving IP. IP Disputes are often technically 
complex and require experts to evaluate the factual situation. Therefore several 
jurisdictions have decided to set up specialized IP courts with expert judges.1 The EU 
has tried but not yet succeeded in following this trend.2  
In the EU there exists a long history of failed proposals to have a EU patent court. The 
latest proposal, in which the member states of the European Patent Convention 
including the EU Member States were planning to set up a European patent court by 
international agreement, was quashed by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) last year in March.3 The main reason given by the Court for declaring the 
proposal contrary to EU law was the wide-ranging jurisdiction of the new patent 
court, which would have put the autonomy of EU law at risk.4 This is an unfortunate 
situation. On the one hand there already exist a EU trademark and a EU design right; 
the Community patent is “in the legislative oven” so to speak. On the other hand there 
is the political will to have a supranational specialized patent court, but the CJEU 
decided that this patent litigation system outside the EU Treaty framework violated 
EU law. So why not having a specialized IP court within the Treaty framework? 
Article 257 TFEU, which allows for the establishment of specialized courts, would in 
principle provide the appropriate legal basis for such a project. 
This paper attempts to give an answer to this question by looking at the project from 
two perspectives. Whether a specialized IP Union court would be a good idea will be 
assessed firstly, from the perspective of private interests, i.e. the desirability of such a 
court from the perspective of private IP litigants. Secondly, the desirability of such a 
                                                 
1 Examples are the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (semi-specialized) or the 
Japanese High Court for Intellectual Property (fully specialized). 
2 The first calls for a European patent judiciary were already raised during the first efforts to 
create a Community patent right by convention in the 1980s (Ullrich (2010) p. 30-32) 
3 Opinion 1/09 of 8 March 2011 
4 Ibid paragraphs 76-78 
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project will be discussed from a public perspective, i.e. which advantages such a court 
would yield to government and the public as a whole. This double perspective will be 
pursued throughout all parts of this paper.  
The different parts of this paper place the project of a Euopean IP court in a wider 
context and are structured by going from the general to the specific. Section II will 
discuss the costs and benefits of specialized adjudication generally, not just in the case 
of IP. Section III will then apply the theory of Section II to specialized adjudication in 
the field of IP. Section IV will subsequently assess the arguments in favor and against 
specialized adjudication in the field of IP in the political environment of the European 
Union. 
II. The case for specialized adjudication 
The aim of this section is to reveal which reasons, in general terms, exist for 
establishing a specialized court within a federal judicial system. Both benefits and 
costs of specialized adjudication will be discussed. Following each point of 
discussion, a proposition will be presented, highlighting under which circumstances 
arguments in favor of specialization are strongest. The result will be the deduction of 
a number of propositions, which will later serve as a non-exhaustive list of indicators 
to help determining whether specialized adjudication in the field of IP is 
recommendable (Section III) and whether it would be a good idea to have specialized 
adjudication in IP matters within the judicial structure of the EU (Section IV). These 
propositions come with the disclaimer of being purely abstract and speculative in 
nature. Their purpose is to structure and highlight different features of specialization, 
which might be determinative to the question of whether it is sensible to set up a 
specialized court. In order to acquire a real and actual guiding function, these 
propositions would have to be subjected to empirical testing.5  
Before engaging in this exercise, it seems appropriate to define in a first step the terms 
(1) specialized court and (2) federal judicial system as used in the following analysis. 
 
                                                 
5 Oldfather (2011) places a lot of emphasis on the point that the case for judicial specialization 
is highly complex and still needs to undergo a lot of theoretical and empirical research.  
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1. Specialized court. Court specialization can come at varying degrees. If court 
specialization is imagined in the form of a continuum, at one end there would be non-
specialized or generalist courts and at the other end fully specialized courts. A 
generalist court would be understood as a court, which hears cases in all fields of law, 
in which all issues are addressed in parallel by other courts within the federal judicial 
system, and which is staffed by generalist judges. A generalist judge is understood as 
an expert in law and in the exercise of decision-making, without however possessing 
expert knowledge in a single area of the law.6  
For the purposes of this work, a fully specialized court would be a judicial body 
which adjudicates disputes falling within only one subject matter, i.e. the scope of its 
jurisdiction ratione materiae would be limited to a specific field of law.7 Furthermore 
such a specialized court would hear all cases in which issues of its subject matter 
jurisdiction arose. Its subject matter jurisdiction would therefore be exclusive, i.e. no 
other court in the federal judicial system would decide these types of cases parallel to 
the specialized court.8 Lastly, a fully specialized court would be staffed by judges 
who are specialists in the subject matter in which the court enjoys limited and 
exclusive jurisdiction. The main three features of a fully specialized court would 
therefore be (1) exclusive, (2) subject matter specific jurisdiction, and a (3) 
specialized bench. Along the continuum there could be courts with only some of these 
three features, e.g. limited to a subject matter but having concurrent jurisdiction to 
generalist courts in disputes falling within that subject matter.9  
The advantages and disadvantages of specialization will be discussed in Section II. A. 
under three headings, according to these three features of a fully specialized court. 
Depending on the location of a specialized court on the specialization continuum, i.e. 
                                                 
6 Posner (1) (1983) p. 778 f. Cognitive psychologists seem to disagree with this point 
however, as they consider that there does not exist a generalized expertise neither in the field 
of problem solving nor in the discipline of analogy use, which seem to be the main tasks in 
the exercise of decision-making or judging (Spellman (2009) p. 19) 
7 This definition is adopted from Revesz’ definition of specialized courts with limited, 
exclusive jurisdiction in Revesz (1990) p. 1125 ff. 
8 ibid. 
9 An example for a specialized court with limited, non-exclusive jurisdiction would be the US 
Tax Court (Revesz (1990) p. 1138). 
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depending on the features implemented in the specialized court, the expected 
advantages or disadvantages would or would not be applicable. 
 
2. Federal judicial system. For the purposes of this work, a federal judicial system is 
understood as the entire court system of a federal political entity composed of both, 
the courts of each of the subunits of the federation and the federal courts. In such a 
system, federal law will usually take precedence over subunit law.  
The judicial or court system of a federation can be either dual or integrated. In dual 
systems each sphere of governance, at subunit and federal level, has its own court 
system, operated separately, with parallel court hierarchies. There will be a clear split 
between federal and subunit jurisdiction. Federal courts will apply federal law 
produced by the federal legislative and subunit courts will apply subunit law produced 
by the subunit legislatives. In integrated system the different spheres of governance 
share one court system within one hierarchical order, authority over which is usually 
shared by the different levels of governance. The courts within an integrated system 
will possess both, jurisdiction over cases arising under federal as well as subunit 
law.10 
For the following analysis, a certain degree of integration of the federal and subunit 
court systems will be assumed, in which at least an appeal from subunit to federal 
courts is possible to check the consistency of subunit law with federal law, which is 
necessary if federal law is assumed to ‘trump’ subunit law. 
 
With these definitions serving as a basis, section II.A. will discuss in how far a 
specialized court might enhance judicial efficiency within a judicial system. It will 
focus particularly on the advantages from a more efficient judicial system to private 
litigants. Section II.B. will discuss how the federal government might benefit from a 
specialized court. These benefits should be understood in as far as the establishment 
of a specialized court may lead to a more effective implementation of policy. These 
benefits should not be understood in the negative sense of how a specialized court 
might be used as an instrument by the executive to enhance its own powers to the 
detriment of the other branches of government. 
 
                                                 
10 Saunders (2006) p. 365 
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A. Judicial economy 
All arguments for having specialized courts in a federal judicial system for reason of 
judicial economy depend on one simple fact: there needs to be a problem in the 
existing court system in the first place. In order to justify the establishment of a 
specialized court, certain inefficiencies need to exist in the current design and 
functioning of the federal court system, which are detrimental to litigants and which 
specialization reasonably promises to remedy.11  
Several examples of such inefficiencies can be given. One example is delayed 
delivery of judgments, because judges are slow in deciding cases. This can be due to 
the burden of an excessive caseload, which requires queuing new cases, or because 
the factual and legal situation of a certain type of cases is so complex, that it will 
require more research and reflection and therefore more judge-hours to resolve the 
case. Another example are unnecessary, excessive costs with which litigants are 
burdened, for example because they need to enforce their rights in several different 
fora with parallel jurisdiction to receive protection across the entire federation. A 
third example would be a court system in which litigants are subject to opportunistic 
litigation, in which an opponent takes advantage of the differences between the 
parallel jurisdictions (forum shopping). As a result, litigants are faced with legal 
uncertainty and inadequate protection of their rights. Apart from creating unfair 
results for individual cases in general, these effects would be particularly damaging in 
areas of the law which are relevant to economic actors because of the uncertainty 
generated for future business decisions. Future business decisions would become less 
predictable and thus riskier, which in turn might reduce the incentives of investing in 
future profitable projects that might have been beneficial to the federation’s economic 
welfare situation as a whole.  
A specialized court in an inefficient court system of generalist courts might therefore 
yield efficiency gains by leading to a faster, cheaper, and qualitatively higher 
adjudication of disputes within a specific field of law. These efficiency gains would 
presumably be generated by the three features of a specialized court: (1) its exclusive 
jurisdiction (2) its monopoly over interpreting one particular statutory scheme 
                                                 
11 Dreyfuss argues for example that the benefits to patent law generated by the US Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit accrued because there were many deficiencies in the 
preceding system (Dreyfuss (1) (1989) p. 66) 
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resulting from its limited subject-matter jurisdiction, and (3) the subject-matter 
expertise of the judges. Each of these features with its advantages and disadvantages 
will be discussed separately in the subsequent sections. 
  
1. Exclusive jurisdiction 
A specialized federal court with exclusive jurisdiction would be the one single 
instance within the federal judicial system hearing all cases of a certain type. Parallel 
jurisdictions in the field of specialization and consequently also disagreement and 
contradicting case law between courts possessing parallel jurisdiction would cease to 
exist. A specialized court would be expected to produce one single coherent body of 
decisions.  
The first and most obvious advantage of a specialized court’s exclusive jurisdiction 
would be the elimination of forum shopping, because parties would not have a choice 
anymore as to the forum in which to litigate. There would be no opportunistic 
litigation, which normally lives from diverging approaches of courts with parallel 
jurisdiction, possible anymore. This would make the system fairer, because horizontal 
equity could be better ensured.12 Additionally, litigants would have a one-stop-shop in 
form of the specialized court to enforce their rights, in case enforcement of particular 
rights was previously split among parallel jurisdictions.  For these reasons the system 
would become cheaper for litigants, because they would not need to file several 
parallel actions anymore. 
 
 Proposition 1: The more undesirable (supply induced) forum shopping can be 
observed in cases of a specific area of the law, the stronger the case for specialized 
adjudication. 
 
A second advantage would be the reduction of the number of cases heard by 
generalist courts, because the fraction of cases which fell within the field of 
specialization of the specialized court would disappear from the generalists’ courts 
dockets. Thereby the number of cases decided by a generalist judge would decrease, 
and he could devote more time to the cases he is left with, which might lead to faster 
                                                 
12 Dreyfuss (1) (1989) p. 2 
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decisions of higher quality of the generalist courts. This would be particularly an 
advantage if an excessive workload for generalist courts caused problems before. 
 
 Proposition 2: The greater generalist courts suffer from a case backlog, the 
stronger the case for specialized adjudication in the field in which accounts for a 
significant share of the generalist courts’ docket. 
 
A third advantage of exclusive jurisdiction would be the fact that a specialized court 
would hear all cases arising in a certain field. The court would, for quantitative 
reasons, quickly acquire more experience in the field than a generalist court only 
hearing a fraction of all cases arising in the federation. As the court would decide in a 
shorter time upon a greater variety of issues within the field of specialization than a 
generalist court, it would likely produce more precedent and therefore make the law 
clearer and more predictable for litigants. Furthermore a repetition of cases of the 
same type might lead to the development of a certain routine which might speed up 
the decision process, thereby reducing judge-hours of the specialist judge invested in 
each case. At the same time, this would lead to a faster delivery of judgments for 
litigants. 
 
Next to the advantages of exclusive jurisdiction there might however also be certain 
drawbacks attached to it. One of the greatest potential disadvantages would 
materialize in cases of complex lawsuits that raise several connected issues in 
different fields of law. Finding a jurisdictional rule that determines when the 
specialized court will hear those complex cases, in which only one of several 
connected issues falls within its subject matter, is difficult. A clear rule delimitating 
the jurisdiction of the specialized court over these cases would however be necessary 
to avoid confusion for litigants.13 One option would be to give the specialized court an 
“entire-case” jurisdiction, i.e. the power to decide the case as a whole as long as one 
of the issues falls within its subject matter. This might however lead to frivolous 
litigation, because an artificial issue might be construed by a party to bring the entire 
case under the jurisdiction of the specialized court. It could also reopen the door to 
forum shopping and bring back strategic litigation, as the specialized court would 
                                                 
13 Dreyfuss (1) (1989) p. 34 
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exercise a parallel jurisdiction to other courts in the issues not generally falling within 
its subject matter. Another option would be to give the specialized court an “issue-
jurisdiction”, i.e. the power to decide separately the issue of the complex case, which 
falls within its subject-matter. This would however require litigants to split their 
lawsuits and litigate different aspects one case in several courts. Needless to say, that 
this would burden litigants again with additional costs and would make litigation 
more complex.14  
 
 Proposition 3: The easier a field of law is separable from other fields of law, the 
stronger the case for specialization. 
 
A second disadvantage of having a single court for all cases of a certain type is that 
the court will probably be located in a large city of the federation. Geographical 
access might become a problem, because litigants might be required to travel and 
incur the costs for traveling.15 The same is true for evidence other than documentary 
evidence, such as the hearing of witnesses or inspection of the location where damage 
took place. It might be a very costly affair to carry witnesses to the specialized court 
or to have staff of the court come to the place where the harmful event occurred.  
 
 Proposition 4: The wealthier the standard group of litigants in a certain field of 
law, the stronger the case for specialization, because geographical access is a minor 
problem for economically strong litigants. 
 
A wealthy standard group of litigants, e.g. multinational companies, could of course 
also choose to resort to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as arbitration 
that would be specially tailored to the circumstances their case. This would eliminate 
the need for a specialized court from the perspective of these parties. Nonetheless, 
private dispute settlement will be only a desirable alternative to adjudication through 
                                                 
14 Dreyfuss (2) (1990) p. 413 f; Posner (1) (1983) p. 787 
15 Dreyfuss (2) (1990) p. 421 f. 
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the public court system if it leaves public interest unaffected.16 Issues that are of 
public interest should not be settled by an arbitration body chosen according to the 
interests of the parties to the dispute, whose procedure to reach a settlement will most 
likely be kept secret, but whose decision will affect third parties or the public at 
large.17 Even though the standard group might be wealthy there may still be an 
economically weaker group of potential litigants which may profit from the law 
developed and decisions rendered by the specialized court. An arbitration panel will 
not yield these positive externalities because it will not produce binding legal rules for 
third parties in its arbitral awards and will give little reasons about how it reached the 
decision.18 
 
A third disadvantage is that exclusive jurisdiction might eliminate desirable 
divergences between parallel jurisdictions. It is possible that cases which are decided 
differently by two courts are hard cases; cases which involve a difficult legal question 
with several possible answers. Disagreement between two courts might firstly have an 
indicating function: to make practitioners, scholars and legislators aware of the fact 
that there exists a hard case. Secondly, judges might be forced to provide better and 
more thorough reasoning in their decisions if faced with a potential diverging opinion 
from another judge on the same issue. This is due to the pressure exerted by peers and 
by the public that might engage in a critical comparison of the two decisions. A 
beneficial competitive pressure between courts might therefore disappear, if all cases 
of a certain type are channeled to a single court.19 
 
A fourth possible disadvantage is that a specialized court will not have any possibility 
of adapting to fluctuations in the number of cases filed. Depending on the subject 
matter of specialization there might be peaks in the caseload and periods in which 
only few cases are filed, especially if the court has done a very good job in clarifying 
                                                 
16 This is a position adopted in certain jurisdictions that do not allow the question of validity 
of a patent to be arbitrated for ordre public reasons, e.g. France and Italy (Janicke (2002) p. 
699) 
17 Dreyfuss (3) (2008) p. 17 
18 Janicke (2002) p. 726 
19 Revesz (1990) p. 1155 ff. 
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the law and less disputes arise as a consequence.20 In periods of reduced caseload, 
fewer judges might be needed. Superfluous judges who as public servants could not 
be fired, would have to be kept and paid despite lack of work to give them. This 
would amount to a waste public resources and could lead to personal dissatisfaction, 
making the job as judge in a specialized court rather unattractive. These problems 
would not arise in a generalist court, which would have other types of cases filling the 
gaps left by a reduced number of cases in a specific field of law.21  
 
2. Uniform interpretation of a single field of law 
The effects resulting from exclusive jurisdiction are closely connected to those 
resulting from limited subject-matter jurisdiction, which will provide the specialized 
court with a monopoly over interpreting the law within a specific field. Whereas the 
former is concerned with the effects of one court deciding all cases within one field, 
the latter is concerned with one single court being in charge of interpreting a statutory 
scheme. One is a monopoly over adjudicating all disputes arising within particular 
subject-matter, which results a uniform body of decisions and aims at remedying 
contradicting rules previously generated by parallel decisions of different courts. The 
other is a monopoly over interpreting a particular field of law, which results in a 
coherent and uniform development of a field of law or statutory scheme (which of 
course will in turn yield a uniform body of decisions as logical consequence).22  
 
One of the main advantages of one single forum administering a body of law is that 
this forum will be capable of monitoring the development of the law and it will be in 
the position of ensuring that the development takes place in a coherent manner. 
Generalist courts that work with all different kinds of statutory schemes might not 
have the opportunity to acquire deep and thorough knowledge of the structure of a 
single statute so as to avoid contradicting interpretations.23 This in turn makes the law 
less predictable for the parties. A specialized court could be expected to decide cases 
                                                 
20 Dreyfuss (1) (1989) p. 23 
21 Posner (1) (1983) p. 788 f. 
22 Revesz (1990) p. 1117 
23 Revesz (1990) p. 1170 
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within one statutory scheme in a unitary manner and with a unitary vision, providing 
stable and predictable case law on a uniform doctrinal basis, which would enhance 
legal certainty and thus be advantageous to litigants. 
 
 Proposition 5: The greater the need for uniformity within a field of law, the 
stronger the case for specialization. 
 
Another advantage related to ensuring the coherence of a statutory scheme, is that a 
specialized court would be capable of enunciating clear and precise legal principles. 
This function might be especially valuable for statutory schemes which contain vague 
substantive terms and rules and therefore leave a great margin of interpretation to the 
judge.24 A specialized court would be in a better position than several parallel 
generalist courts, to provide clearer guidelines to parties, thereby again providing 
more precision, predictability and legal certainty.25 
 
 Proposition 6: The greater the vagueness of the statutory terms within a field of 
law, the greater the need for case law providing precision, the stronger the case for 
specialized adjudication. 
 
As with any monopoly, there are however also certain disadvantages attached to one 
single forum being responsible for the interpretation and application of a statutory 
scheme. Whereas the internal coherence of that statutory scheme might be insured, 
external coherence of the body of federal law as a whole might be jeopardized. Many 
basic concepts of law, e.g. the concept of “bad faith”, can be found simultaneously in 
many different areas of the law. Whereas a generalist court would deal with cases 
from all different fields of law, and could achieve developing a consistent approach to 
such basic legal principles that span across the entire system, or could at least 
critically assess why it would be (un)reasonable to give to one concept different 
                                                 
24 Petersen & Schovsbo argue in favor of a specialized patent court inter alia because the 
central components and rules of patent law are very imprecise, which give a court greater 
interpretative leeway but also require a greater shaping function of the court (Petersen & 
Schovsbo (2011) p. 5). 
25 Dreyfuss (1) (1989) p. 8 
 15 
meanings depending on the field of law in which it is applied, a specialized court 
would lack the broad picture to test this type of coherence due to its limited 
jurisdiction.26 Furthermore the specialized court would suffer efficiency losses from 
not being able to make use of already developed concepts from other fields of law.27  
As a consequence federal law as a whole might become more incoherent, and 
procedures before the specialized court more idiosyncratic. This might lead to a 
fragmentation of the federal legal system, making it more complex and therefore less 
user-friendly for litigants. 
 
 Proposition 7: The less important the coherence of federal law as a whole vis-à-vis 
the importance of the coherence within a field of federal law, the stronger the case for 
specialized adjudication. 
 
Furthermore the likely emergence of a distinct procedure and legal practice before the 
specialized court might fuel the emergence of a specialized bar.28 Between specialist 
judges and specialized attorneys could emerge a separate technical (for outsiders 
impenetrable) language and procedure, which would drive the specialized court into 
isolation. This would be akin to the rise of a separate legal system around the 
specialized court within the federal judicial system.29 The specialized judges and 
specialized bar might even actively push for such a development to create their own 
niche. An isolated position of specialization might facilitate escaping accountability 
and might help to justify it own existence without fearing too much scrutiny.30 
Understanding the law produced by the specialized court would become a challenge 
for lawyers outside the field of specialization. Coordination between the specialized 
court and the generalist courts of the federal system would thus become more 
difficult. This would especially pose a problem when appeals from the specialized 
                                                 
26 Revesz (1990) p. 1162 ff. 
27 Posner (1) (1983) p. 787 
28 Oldfather (2011) p. 6 
29 Dreyfuss compares this to the re-establishment of the writ system (Dreyfuss (1) (1989) p. 
68) 
30 also described as „internal capture“ by Garoupa, Dari-Mattiaci and Gómez-Pomar  (2010) 
p. 807 
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court are possible to a higher generalist court. If the judges of the higher court are not 
entirely familiar with language and procedure of the specialized court they might be 
softer in their review due to lack of understanding and might be more reluctant to 
reverse judgments from the specialized court. If the higher court is prevented from 
exercising effective supervision, mistakes made by the specialized court might not be 
corrected.31  
 
A third disadvantage can emerge from a feature that has been described as advantage 
above, namely the development of a piece of legislation through a unitary vision of 
the specialized court.  This feature might work as an advantage, as long as the 
specialized court’s unitary vision is backed by public consensus as to the policy goal 
pursued. If the public is split about the purpose and goal of a certain piece of 
legislation, a specialized court might be caught in that conflict, having to deal with 
accusations of being partisan with one of the camps. Neutrality is however one of the 
defining characteristics of a court, and an absolute precondition for it to survive in the 
long term.32 A generalist court would not face this kind of existential problem, 
because of the heterogeneity of its docket. As it would only now and then produce a 
controversial decision, the public would not call the institution as a whole into 
question, but limit its critique to single decisions of the generalist court.33 
 
 Proposition 8: The greater public consensus about the goal of a federal statutory 
scheme, the stronger the case for specialized adjudication. 
3. Expertise 
Apart from having exclusive and limited jurisdiction, a specialized court would be 
staffed by specialist judges.34 These judges would only sit in the specialized court and 
would have expert knowledge in a certain field of law.35 Such specialist judges could 
                                                 
31 Garoupa, Dari-Mattiacci & Gómez-Pomar (2010) p. 808 
32 Shapiro (1981) p. 17 
33 Dreyfuss (2) (1990), p. 415 
34 This is only an assumption for the purposes of this work and not a general conditio sine qua 
non. A specialized court could also be staffed by generalist judges, as discussed in Revesz 
(1990), p. 1130 ff. 
35 Revesz (1990) p. 1130 
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even be qualified in an academic or scientific discipline other than law, relating to the 
subject matter which is covered by the courts’ field of specialization.36 An example 
would be economists sitting in a court specialized in antitrust law, psychologists 
specialized in childhood development in family courts or engineers in patent courts. 
 
An obvious advantage of an expert bench would be the ability of the judges to grasp 
and analyze complex issues of law and fact more quickly and more accurately than 
generalist judges. The more complex a statutory scheme, and the more a decision 
under that scheme depends on facts which require expert knowledge for their 
evaluation, the higher the expected value of the judges’ expertise.37 A specialized 
court would be expected to take less time to decide these complex cases than a 
generalist court. Furthermore the expertise of the judges should ensure the correctness 
of the results.38 Consequently, litigants would face shorter decision periods and would 
receive decisions of a higher quality. Additionally, generalist courts would be released 
from these complex and time-consuming cases. Their caseload would not only 
quantitatively but also qualitatively reduced. 
 
 Proposition 9: The more complex and technical the factual and/or legal situation 
of a field of law, the higher the value of expert judges, the stronger the case for 
specialized adjudication. 
 
A second advantage derived from specialist judges is that parties might not need to 
invest as heavily in specialized attorneys and expert witnesses, because specialist 
judges could compensate with their subject matter knowledge for these extra costs. 
Litigating would therefore become cheaper for the parties.39 
 
There are however also disadvantages attached to staffing a court with expert judges. 
A first problem might be that a specialized bench is more likely to be captured by 
                                                 
36 Dreyfuss (1) (1989) p. 2 
37 Dreyfuss (1) (1989) p. 67 
38 Dreyfuss (2) (1990) p. 409 
39 Dreyfuss (2) (1990) p. 421; a greater involvement of the judge might however be seen as a 
disadvantage in adversarial systems. 
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interest groups than a bench composed of generalists. The group of persons eligible 
for the office of expert judge consists of a very narrow segment of specialists 
compared to the group of professionals from which generalist judges are chosen.40 It 
would be therefore easier for interest groups to capture the nomination process of a 
specialist bench. Furthermore it might yield greater benefits to interest groups to exert 
influence over a specialized bench, because the bench might decide exclusively cases 
which are relevant to the interest group. A generalist court will have such a broad 
range of cases that cases of interest for the interest group will only appear irregularly 
before it.41 A biased specialized bench will be of course disadvantageous to the parties 
before it. The resulting lack of trust in the specialized judges by the parties litigating 
before it and the public in general might reduce the lifetime of the specialized court 
significantly.42 
 
A second disadvantage could materialize when there exists a lack of professional 
consensus among experts as to the fundamental questions of the courts’ field of 
specialization, which could adversely affect the decisions it produces. The more 
submerged a professional is in a certain field of law, the more he will be aware of 
different ideologies within the field and the more likely he will be a follower of one of 
these ideologies. A judge who takes decisions on the basis of an ideology will be 
however less objective. Additionally, there might be an ideological division between 
the specialist judges, which might lead to polar-opposite decisions. Instead of 
producing a stable, predictable case law, a specialist court might produce case law 
vacillating between two extremes.43 The goal of a specialized court bringing 
uniformity and predictability to the law would be therefore jeopardized. 
 
                                                 
40 Revesz (1990) p. 1148 f. 
41 Revesz (1990) p. 1149 ff. 
42 The history of the US Commerce Court (1910 – 1913), which only survived for three years 
is an example supporting this thesis (Dreyfuss (2) (1990), p. 391 ff.) 
43 Posner (1) (1983), p. 780 ff.; This seems to be supported by an empirical study describing 
the emergence of two radically opposing methods (procedural vs. holistic) of construing 
patent claims in the US Federal Circuit (Polk Wagner & Petherbridge (2004) p. 1151) 
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As a third disadvantage it might be difficult to attract highly qualified personnel to a 
specialized court. The prospect of the monotonous work of deciding the same type of 
cases and of not having any variation in the legal questions posed to the specialized 
court might deter bright minds to serve in it.44 The reputation and the efficiency gains, 
especially in form of the quality of decisions, generated by a court might however 
very much depend upon the judges who sit in it.45 Less qualified judges will produce 
decision of a lower quality, which will be detrimental to the parties litigating before 
the specialized court. 
 
Lastly, there is considerable doubt in literature about whether a judge possessing 
expertise, i.e. substantive knowledge within a certain field, necessarily also possesses 
better decision-making skills than a generalist judge when resolving concrete disputes 
within his field of expertise.46 The quality of the decision in terms of correctness of 
the result might therefore not improve if decisions are taken by experts in the 
specialized court. 
 
B. Supporting instrument of federal policy 
Achieving an efficient federal judicial system might very well be a desirable policy 
goal from the perspective of a federal government. The main potential benefits of the 
establishment of a specialized court for reasons of judicial economy will however be 
accrued by litigants which were previously dissatisfied by an inefficient generalist 
court system. The previous section on judicial economy thus highlighted principally 
benefits and costs of specialized adjudication for private parties. This section is 
concerned rather with benefits and potential costs of specialized adjudication at 
federal level for the federal government. It will analyze in how far a specialized court 
might be a useful tool to implement federal policy (in policy fields unrelated to the 
efficient functioning of the federal judicial system). 
                                                 
44 Posner (1) (1983) p. 779 
45 Dreyfuss (2) (1990), p. 425 
46 Oldfather (2011) p. 22 
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1. Internal policy goals 
Whenever there are divergences between the laws of the subunits within a federation, 
which are in some way detrimental to the common ends of the federation, the federal 
government might, depending on the constitutional design of the federation, possess 
the competence to enact federal legislation harmonizing the conflicting laws across 
the subunits.47 Whenever harmonized regional legislation were enforced in regional 
courts, the harmonizing effects of federal legislation would possibly not fully ‘bite’ 
however, due to divergences between the approaches of regional courts. The 
appropriate tool to ensure a uniform implementation of federal legislation with a 
harmonizing function in a specific area might be a specialized court with sole power 
of administering that harmonizing legislative instrument.  
 
The same is true for federal law, which is not concerned with harmonizing regional 
laws but is directly imposed from the federal level upon the regional subunits.48 If the 
federal judicial system is integrated and regional courts therefore apply and interpret 
also federal law, divergences between these courts’ approaches might render federal 
legislation ineffective. Alternatively cooperation between regional courts could be 
encouraged, which is however less promising in bringing about uniformity across a 
field of law than a federal specialized court.49 
 
 Proposition 10: The more decisive the uniform judicial interpretation of a piece of 
federal legislation for achieving the goal of a certain policy, the stronger the case for 
establishing a specialized federal court. 
 
Again however, there might be also disadvantages attached to the institution of a 
federal specialized court viewed from the perspective of the federal government. The 
fact that a piece of legislation is interpreted in a uniform way does not mean that the 
uniform interpretation by the specialized court will correspond with the underlying 
                                                 
47 In the EU context Directives would be considered to be such legislative instruments. 
48In the EU context Regulations would be considered to be such legislative instruments. This 
attempted separation is derived from a discussion about harmonization versus federalization 
of laws in Bermann (1996) p. 39 
49 Halberstam & Reimann (2010) p.18 
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legislative will. Since the specialist judges will posses expertise, they might be 
inclined to interpret statutory rules in a very broad way. Their in-depth knowledge of 
the subject-matter might lead them to supplementing the legislative text with 
additional tests or rules to reach a more equitable or accurate result in concrete cases. 
Where a generalist judge might be cautious, an expert judge might be more (or even 
over-) confident in going beyond the statutory text.50 In short, specialist judges could 
be expected to engage more in judicial activism than generalist judges.51 The federal 
government would therefore have to take into account that a specialized court might 
be more likely to depart from the legislative will and might therefore not further as 
effectively the policy goals of the federal government as envisaged. 
 
Another potential disadvantage the federal government might have to take into 
consideration is the risk of capture of the specialized court by interest groups as 
described in Section II.3. (Expertise).  
 
A last and very important issue of concern for the federal government with setting up 
a specialized federal court is the resistance such a project could face within the 
subunits of the federation.52 The setting up of a federal court affects the balance of 
powers distributed between the federal sphere of governance and the subunits. If the 
specialized court possesses exclusive jurisdiction its establishment will entail a 
transfer of competences from sub-unit courts to the specialized federal court. Even if 
it were not a court of exclusive jurisdiction, it would still inflict a potentially 
unwanted competitive pressure on the subunits courts. Especially in the case that 
subunits already have themselves specialized courts, the federal specialized court 
would have to represent an improvement in terms of quality and efficiency to be an 
accepted solution by those subunits which already have specialized courts.53  
                                                 
50 Oldfather (2011) p. 24 f. 
51 As expressed by Landes & Posner : “a specialized court is more likely to have a ‘mission’ 
orientation that a generalist court” (Landes & Posner (2003) p. 418) 
52 Many thanks to Dominik Hanf (College of Europe, Bruges) for making me aware of this 
point. 
53 An argument advanced by Smits & Bull against the Unified Patent Court proposal for the 
EU is the existence of e.g. the German district court in Düsseldorf (Landgericht Düsseldorf) 
as a national court that is de facto specialized in patent cases and has a broad base of case law 
 22 
 
2. External policy goals 
Divergences between regional courts when applying federal law might not only be 
damaging to the functioning of a federation internally, but might also have negative 
external effects. In areas of law which are relevant for foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in the federation for example, divergences between regional courts’ interpretation of 
federal law might act as a disincentive for foreign economic players to invest, because 
they will not have a guarantee that their investment will be protected in a uniform and 
predictable manner throughout the federation. A federal specialized court might 
increase the credibility and reliability of the federation in this respect, because it 
would be in the position to ensure that foreign investors’ rights are uniformly 
protected within the federation. As a specialized court might therefore be an 
supporting instrument of a policy encouraging FDI, such a judicial institution might 
improve the international competitive position of the federation. 
 
The same is true for obligations arising under international law, which bind the 
federation as a whole and not every single of its subunits separately. A specialized 
court that would ensure that obligations arising under a certain international treaty are 
honored by and within the federation might increase a federations’ trustworthiness on 
the international plane and might make it a more attractive partner for the conclusion 
of international agreements. 
 
 Proposition 11: Whenever a federation has engaged on international level in a 
project aiming the unification of laws, the stronger the case for specialized federal 
adjudication to comply with international obligations arising from such a project. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
and experience to draw from in comparison to a new European patent court (Smits & Bull 
(2012) p. 15). 
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III. The case for specialized adjudication in the field of 
intellectual property 
 
A. The nature of IP Litigation 
With the rise of the information society the value of IP and the number of existing IP 
rights has experienced a steep increase.54 Consequently, the number of IP disputes has 
also been rising in the past decades and most likely will continue to rise.55 IP disputes 
fall within the general class of private law cases. Unless they concern a dispute 
between a private party and an IP right granting government authority, such as a 
patent office, the litigants in an IP case will both be private parties. IP disputes will 
arise around one of the general types of recognized IP rights such as patent and 
design, copyright, trade marks and trade secrets. Most IP cases will require the court 
hearing the case to decide upon two main issues, namely (1) the validity of the IP 
right on which the action is based and (2) whether the applicant’s IP right has been 
infringed by the defendant (which is akin to determining the scope of protection 
granted by the IP right). In the case of IP rights subject to registration, patents and 
registered trade marks being the most prominent examples,56 the question of validity 
will usually involve an indirect review of the administrative agency’s decision 
granting the IP right on which the action is based. The court hearing the IP dispute 
will therefore act as control instance for decisions of the IP office. In some 
jurisdictions, such as Germany, generalist courts do not have the competence to 
decide upon the validity of registered IP rights. IP disputes raising the issue of validity 
                                                 
54 E.g. in the period of 1985-2010 world wide patent and trademark applications have doubled 
(source WIPO statistics http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/ [last visited October 14, 2012]) 
55 E.g. in the US the number of patent law suits filed in the federal district courts has tripled 
since 1980 (source: http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/08/02/patent-litigation-statistics-1980-
2010/id=17995/ [last visited October 14, 2012]) 
56 Other registrable IP rights are e.g. plant varieties 
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need to be stayed and a specialized judicial body57 will decide upon the validity. Once 
the issue of validity is decided the generalist court will continue the proceedings. 
1. IP law  
a. The nature of IP rights 
IP law is a system establishing temporary rights over creations of the human intellect 
in many of its forms such as inventions, pieces of art, literature, music, signs used in 
the course of trade to designate the origin of a product etc. These rights can either 
arise automatically, such as copyright, or their coming into existence can be subject to 
registration, such as patent and trademark. They give the owner of a piece of 
intellectual property the right to exclude others from using, copying, adapting, 
distributing or otherwise interfering with the use and exploitation of their intellectual 
product. They also entitle the IP owner to transfer his IP right to someone else. The 
exclusionary nature erga omnes and the transferability of rights in IP make IP rights 
akin to rights in physical property.58 
Traditionally, IP rights are said to have two main functions. The first function is to 
protect the moral right of an author or inventor of an intellectual work to be 
designated as such and his right to integrity of his work. The underlying rationale is 
that a person should be entitled to the fruit of his labor.59 The second function, which 
is by now the more prominent function of IP protection, is of an economic nature. The 
prospects of receiving an exclusionary right to exploit a piece of intellectual work on 
the market, thus the possibility to reap monopoly profits from ones intellectual work, 
should act as an incentive to produce IP.60 To maximize the production of IP is thus 
seen as a benefit to society. It represents a tradeoff between the temporary social costs 
of granting a monopoly position to an IP producer on the market against the social 
                                                 
57 For Germany this court is the Federal German Patent Court (Bundespatentgericht) located 
in Munich, which has jurisdiction over issues of validity in patent and trademark cases, as 
well as an appellate jurisdiction to hear appeals from the German Patent and Trademark 
Office (Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt) 
58 Landes & Posner (2003) p. 12 
59 Dinwoodie (2001) p. 513 
60 Ibid 
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gains of having a higher rate of innovation thanks to a higher production of IP and, 
once the IP rights expire, to have more works freely available in the public domain. 
 
b. The enforcement of IP rights 
An important feature of IP rights when it comes to their enforcement is their territorial 
nature. Even though the market for IP products is global, all the more so with the rise 
of the Internet age, IP rights are restricted to the jurisdiction in which they are 
protected by law. The geographical scope of protection of IP rights is therefore 
limited to the national territory and the material scope of protection is determined by 
the applicable national law providing protection.61 For registered IP rights this means 
that they are only valid in the territory for which the granting agency has the power to 
issue IP rights. If an inventor wants to receive protection for his intelligent vacuum 
cleaner with integrated mp3-player function in Spain, New Zealand and Jamaica, he 
will have to apply for a patent in each of these jurisdictions separately. For all types of 
IP rights this means, that they can only be enforced territorially. If a copyright is for 
example infringed in three different places, let us say Germany, Mexico and Japan, 
the copyright owner will have to go to the courts of each of these states separately and 
claim the protection of his right against the local infringer. Dispute resolution in IP 
cases which span across multiple jurisdictions is thus complex by nature. 
 
c. Vagueness of IP law 
A last noteworthy feature of IP law is that it hardly has strict and clear core rules to 
determine the scope of protection of individual IP rights. Uncertainty about the 
boundaries of IP means that there is equal uncertainty to determine whether 
infringement has taken place.62 To ascertain whether a patent has been validly issued 
for example, a court needs to determine whether an invention truly represented an 
‘inventive step’ or was ‘non-obvious to a person skilled in the art’.63 These vague 
                                                 
61 Dinwoodie (2001) p. 28 
62 Meurer (2002) p. 4 f. 
63 e.g. Article 27 TRIPS Agreement, which uses the term “inventive step” to describe the 
“non-obviousness”-requirement: “An ‘inventive step’ must go beyond techniques which any 
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terms allow for an array of different interpretations. And even if the court finds the 
patent valid, there might still be uncertainty about the exact scope of the patent 
protection pursuant the language of the patent claim.64 The same applies to copyright, 
e.g. when determining whether a painting for which a copyright is claimed fulfills the 
requirement of being ‘original’ in order for a copyright to have come into existence in 
the first place. To give one last example from the area of trademark law, a trademark 
is liable for infringing an earlier mark if it is ‘similar’ to the earlier mark, is claimed 
for ‘similar’ goods and services, and is likely to cause ‘consumer confusion’.65 No 
further guidelines on which basis a similarity should be established are provided in 
the law. The vagueness generally found in IP law poses an additional challenge for 
the enforcement of IP rights, next to the territorial nature of IP rights in a world with a 
global market for IP. 
 
d. IP and other areas of the law 
Issues of IP law can frequently arise in connection with issues from other areas of the 
law, in particular competition law, contract law and fundamental rights law.  
As IP rights confer a monopoly on the market to the right holder, they appear to be in 
automatic conflict with the rules of competition law, which aim at ensuring free 
competition among competitors in a market.66 In practice such conflicts do not arise 
very often however. Restrictions in time and scope of IP make sure that the existence 
of IP rights does not strangle competition to an unacceptable degree. Issues of IP and 
competition law can however arise together and be subject of a dispute, e.g. when a 
dominant market player is using his IP right to stifle competition on the market. 
Whereas an ordinary IP holder might not be in the position of influencing prices, 
inhibiting competitors from entering the market or engaging in other anti-competitive 
behavior, a powerful market player might be able to do so with the help of an IP right. 
                                                                                                                                            
expert can immediately interfere from accessible knowledge. Inventions, in order to be new, 
must go beyond the available state of the art” (Dreier, Thomas & Véron (2008) p. 85 f. 
64 Meurer (2002) p. 5. 
65 E.g. Article 16 TRIPS Agreement or Article 8 (1) (b) Community Trademark Regulation 
(Council Regulation No. 207/2009)  
66 This concern has been raised for a long time e.g. Gadow (1930) p.14 
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Issues of IP and contract law are arising more and more frequently because disputes 
arise around licensing agreements. The rights to copy, reproduce or otherwise exploit 
a protected intellectual work are frequently transferred by contract to another party. 
When the license contract is subject to litigation, issues of IP law in relation to the IP 
right which is the subject of the contract such as validity or fair use, can arise. 
Sometimes intellectual property rights can conflict with fundamental rights. Most IP 
rights are subject to public order exceptions, which prevent an otherwise valid IP right 
from coming into existence. An example is the non-patentability of biotechnology 
which has been developed by using human embryonic material.67 In some 
jurisdictions such inventions are not patentable because they interfere with public 
morals and are considered offensive to human dignity. Another example stemming 
from the area of copyright is the interference of copyright with freedom of expression. 
Even though there are fair use exceptions which allow e.g. to cite a copyrighted work 
for the purposes of critique or satire, in other circumstances a copyright might still 
impinge upon the freedom of expression of another person.68 
2. The parties 
a. A standard group of litigants? 
IP rights cover a wide range of different endeavors of the human mind, which results 
in a very heterogeneous group of IP creators and owners. There is thus a different 
potential standard group of litigants firstly, according to the type of IP involved in the 
dispute. Secondly, even for each type of IP right taken separately the group of 
litigants can be quite diverse. In the case of patents for example, patent holders are 
often very large firms in R&D intensive industries. At the same time there are also 
smaller firms, independent inventors, universities and non-profit organizations 
holding patents and engaging in patent litigation.69 Often the nature of the litigants 
will depend on the market sector of inventive activity and the costs of innovation 
within that market.70  
                                                 
67 see e.g. Case C-34/10 Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace e.V. [2011] paragraph 34 
68 Smith (2010) p. 89 
69 Bessen & Meurer (1) (2005) p. 8 ff. 
70 For pharmaceuticals market e.g., costs of innovation are generally very high; therefore 
patent litigants in this sector will usually be large multinationals.  
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Common to most IP owners is that they are actors of innovative and creative 
industries. What is also common to them is that outcomes of previous litigation will 
influence future decisions and therefore affect the general rate of innovation within an 
economy.71 
 
b. Use of IP rights in strategic litigation 
IP rights make an ideal object of strategic litigation for two reasons: firstly, the 
procedural setting for enforcing IP rights encourages forum shopping and secondly, 
the inherent vagueness of substantive IP law as it currently stands facilitates the 
possibility of filing successful anti-competitive and opportunistic lawsuits.  
As already mentioned, IP practice is international in terms of development, licensing 
and marketing of IP. The enforcement of IP rights remains however territorial and is 
thus in the hand of national courts. As national IP laws are not harmonized, especially 
when it comes to remedies for infringement, and private international law rules 
relating to IP are rather undeveloped,72 the same case might yield very different 
judgments depending on the court deciding the case. Parties to an IP suit might thus 
not only succeed in lawsuits due to the objective merit of their case, but depending on 
the forum in which they choose to litigate. It is not by accident, to give a European 
example, that 60 % of all patent infringement cases in Europe are litigated before the 
district court of Düsseldorf in Germany.73 German law offers particularly severe 
preliminary injunctions to patent plaintiffs, which allow them to stop alleged 
infringers from placing potentially infringing products on the market. Other 
jurisdictions will only allow for preliminary injunctions in the form of damage 
payments. In other jurisdictions, harsh measures such as the removal of infringing 
products from the market will only be imposed on the defendant once actual 
infringement has been established. Patent plaintiffs will therefore not simply sue in 
German courts because they want to have a dispute involving their patent adjudicated 
(a legitimate reason to use a court system), but because they might achieve a 
                                                 
71 Dreyfuss (1) p. 67 
72 Dreyfuss (3) p. 3 f. 
73 German news magazine DER SPIEGEL 16/2012, p. 111 
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temporary prohibition of the sale of goods of a competitor in the German market, 
irrespective of the final outcome of the case (an abusive use of the court system). 
 
Next to the opportunities for strategic litigation offered by the territorial nature of IP 
enforcement, IP law itself, irrespective of which national court is applying it, is prone 
to being used in defensive, anti-competitive and opportunistic litigation tactics.74 This 
is due to the difficulties for a court to establish unambiguously the validity and scope 
of IP rights which in turn is due to the vague language of the legal provisions 
constituting IP rights.  
Large IP holders have engaged in building defensive IP portfolios to protect 
themselves against the growing hazard of being a defendant in an IP suit. This has 
been observed especially in the case of patents, where large patent portfolios are used 
to ward off lawsuits by competitors and co-innovators with the threat of credible 
counterclaims. Defensive IP portfolios serve at the same time as a ‘weapon’ in 
negotiation, offering a better bargaining position to trade in IP rights. This is 
particularly the case for companies in industries which heavily rely on building on 
previous IP and where cross-licensing is common, such as the semiconductor 
industry.75 
Additionally, plaintiffs might base their suits on weak IP rights, i.e. on rights whose 
validity might be successfully challenged, or they might file weak cases in which, 
despite the validity of the IP, chances of successfully proving infringement are low.76 
Plaintiffs might choose to go to court with such cases to either damage a competitor in 
a shared market, to drive a competitor out or to prevent the entry of a competitor to 
the market. Market players engage in IP litigation in these cases to extract a maximum 
value of the exclusionary rights of their IP by damaging competitors. Their goal is to 
broaden the scope of their temporary monopoly as much as possible. These suits are 
therefore termed anti-competitive. Alternatively, plaintiffs might engage in such 
tactics to extract license payments from the defendant, which they might otherwise 
not be able to extract. These IP suits are therefore termed opportunistic.77  
                                                 
74 These three tactics are described for patents in Bessen & Meurer (1) (2005) p.14 
75 Ibid p. 15 
76 Meurer (2002) p. 3 
77 Ibid.  
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One might ask why an innocent defendant would feel threatened by lawsuits that 
eventually lead to a ruling against the plaintiff anyway. The main reason for weak IP 
cases being credible is the inherent vagueness of validity and scope of IP rights, 
which is determined purely on the facts of the case; these facts might however not be 
readily accessible to the defendant and a court might easily err about them. As it has 
been put, the boundaries of intellectual property, unlike those for real property, where 
“the boundaries of a plot of land and the validity of a title usually can be verified at 
little cost and with little uncertainty”78, are difficult to determine. A weak IP right or 
suit might therefore be difficult to distinguish from an ordinary IP suit and the 
chances for a non-infringing defendant to incur liability are significant. Furthermore 
economically powerful plaintiffs might file weak IP suits because weaker defendants 
might simply not survive the suit due to overburdening costs for mounting a defense 
imposed upon them.79 
 
3. The bench  
 
As discussed under Section III.A.1., the most important task of a judge hearing an IP 
case is to determine whether something qualifies for IP protection and in case it does, 
how far the scope of protection for this IP right reaches. This is not an easy task 
because the law offers little guidance and the factual situation of IP cases is often 
highly complex.80 Additionally, the jargon used by specialized lawyers obfuscates an 
IP case for a judge even further.81 The problem with jargon in patent cases was 
described US Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes already in 1925 when he 
wrote: 
“Ideas rarely are difficult to grasp.  The difficulties come from the language ... 
                                                 
78 Bessen & Meurer (2) (2005) p. 1 
79 “According to a 2009 American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) report, the 
median cost of taking a major patent case to trial is $5.5 million per side in attorney’s fees.” 
(Lemley (2011) p. 385; Meurer (2002) p. 6) 
80 Quoting the Canadian IP lawyer G. F. Henderson: “by and large [IP law is] the most 
technical [area] both in terms of the factual subject matter and the law itself even when 
compared to tax, constitutional and competition law” (Henderson (1991) p. 17) 
81 Vaver (2006) p. 4 
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To this day I am troubled as I hear arguments in patents [...] cases, by the slang 
of the specialty. The thoughts behind the words rarely require a colossus.”82 
It appears therefore, that the ideal bench hearing IP cases should have a knowledge 
going beyond IP statutes and IP legal doctrine, which would enable the judges to base 
their decisions on their knowledge of the nature of IP itself and the rationales for IP 
protection, as well as IP policies underlying IP legislation. In order to confidently 
determine the scope of protection of an IP right and to reach subsequently equitable 
outcomes in IP cases, judges would need to truly understand arguments of specialized 
lawyers and should be able to confidently grasp the factual background of each case. 
Some examples of different types of IP can illustrate this point.  
In a patent infringement case, the first exercise a judge needs to undertake is to 
interpret the language of the patent claim to determine which type of products are 
covered by the patent right. This is ordinarily termed claim construction.83 The patent 
owner will logically push for the broadest possible interpretation of the claim, to 
cover as many products as possible. The alleged infringer will usually argue firstly, 
that the patent is invalid and alternatively, for a very narrow interpretation of the 
claim.84 The judge is required to construe the patent claim from the perspective of a 
‘person skilled in the art’, i.e. from the perspective of a scientist within the field of the 
patent in question a the time the patent was issued. Consider for example a patent 
covering artificially produced hormones, which stimulate the production of red blood 
cells (erythropoietin). Subsequently, another company produces the same hormones 
on the basis of a different process.85 How can a judge confidently determine whether 
the former patent covers the later activity on the basis of whether a biochemist at the 
moment of patenting could have foreseen the subsequent different manufacturing 
process of the hormones and intended to cover it with his patent? This is what the law 
requires him to do however. For a judge without a technical background to position 
himself in the shoes of a scientist seems to be a virtually impossible requirement to 
                                                 
82 Posner (2) (ed.) (1997) p. 52 
83 Schwartz (2009) p. 1705 
84 Ibid p. 1708 
85 facts taken from Kirin-Amgen Inc and others v Hoechst Marion Russel Ltd and others 
[2005] 1 All ER 667 (Judgment from the UK House of Lords (since 2009 Supreme Court of 
the United Kingdom)) 
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fulfill. A judge with technical training would be better suited to decide these 
questions. Additionally to the benefits of a patent judge with technical expertise, it has 
been claimed that patent judges should also have experience with the business aspects 
of technology, to give full and accurate effect to patent laws.86 
In cases related to copyright a judge would be equally required to base his decision on 
law which offers little guidance in individual cases. In a copyright case, a judge will 
usually have to decide whether an expression or artistic work is ‘original’ in order to 
receive copyright protection. To determine ‘originality’ of a piece of literature or art, 
especially in derivative works, will however usually entail some sort of (often hidden) 
assessment of the artistic value of the object for which copyright is claimed.87 Could a 
painting that copies exactly a film scene from the movie the Wizard of Oz claim 
copyright protection?88 Is it still an original work? The plain language ‘originality’-
standard does not provide a clear answer to this question. A judge might have to 
engage in making some aesthetic assessment about the artistic quality of the work to 
determine whether it is worthy of copyright protection.89 Otherwise he might have to 
search for other methods of evaluation why such a derivative work might or might not 
qualify as ‘original’. If each court faced with such a case chooses a different 
theoretical background to base its decision upon, the standard of ‘originality’ in 
copyright law remains vague and unpredictable to the detriment of producers of 
artistic works. 
One last example of vague IP law terms posing a challenge to a judge in the field of 
trademark law is the requirement of a ‘likelihood of consumer confusion’ for 
trademark infringement. Consider a trademark owner of an earlier mark “Lloyd” for 
shoes who sues a competitor distributing shoes with the label “Loint’s”.90 Are the 
word signs sufficiently similar to confuse the public when buying shoes? The law 
does not offer any further guidelines to the judge on which factors are important to 
                                                 
86 Sung (2008) p. 29 
87 Haight Farley (2005) p. 834 
88 In the US, according to Judge Posner it could not because it lacks originality (facts drawn 
from Gracen v Bradford Exchange 698 F.d2 300 (7th Circuit 1983)). This opinion seems to be 
a minority opinion among practitioners and scholars however. 
89 Haight Farley (2005) p. 834 
90 Facts drawn from Case C-342/92 Lloyd v Klijsen Handel [1999] (Judgment from the Court 
of Justice of the European Union) 
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determine similarity. How could an accurate judgment be made in this case however 
without knowing the competitive structure of the shoe market and how the purchasing 
pattern of consumers looks like in this market? It would be of advantage if a judge 
deciding such a case could rely on prior knowledge about business and economics to 
ensure an equitable outcome of the case, based on solid reasoning. 
 
4. Conclusion on the desirability of specialized IP adjudication in light of 
the propositions – A private perspective 
When tested against the propositions of Section I.A. several features of IP law and IP 
litigation would serve as arguments in favor of establishing a specialized IP court. 
Firstly, the current structure of IP law, which is restricted to national territories, and 
the cross-border constellation in which IP disputes frequently arise nowadays, 
together with underdeveloped jurisdictional conflict rules in the field of IP, give rise 
to substantial forum shopping (Propsition 1). A specialized IP court with exclusive 
jurisdiction would reduce the potential of forum shopping by pooling the jurisdiction 
previously shared by several parallel courts. Even if the specialized court had a non-
exclusive jurisdiction, it would at least provide the possibility to a plaintiff, which 
would otherwise have to file a number of parallel actions to enforce his IP rights, to 
file only one single action in the specialized court. IP litigation would therefore 
become more transparent and possibly cheaper.  
Secondly, geographical access (Proposition 2) would not pose a high barrier to 
litigants, because most litigants in IP disputes are undertakings. Potentially 
geographical access could be a problem for small and medium-sized enterprises. A 
solution would be the setting up of a specialized court with a central division and 
several regional division.91  
Thirdly, decisions in IP cases have repercussions on future innovative activity. As 
substantive IP law is very vague, uniform and clear case law is necessary to provide 
the required legal guidelines to undertakings and private persons pursuing innovative 
                                                 
91 See e.g. Article 5 of the Draft Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st14/st14268.en12.pdf [last visited October 15, 
2012] 
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activities (Propositions 4 and 5). A specialized IP court would have the expertise and 
experience to provide such guiding case law. 
Lastly, technical expertise is clearly an asset in IP cases. Especially in patent cases 
(Proposition 9), where knowledge in sciences is necessary to accurately interpret 
patent claims.92 But in principle the vagueness of IP law rules requires in all areas of 
IP a (non-legal) background knowledge upon which to base a decision in a dispute. A 
court staffed with experts would probably lead to a higher quality of IP case law and 
to more satisfactory results for IP litigants. 
 
Other features of IP law will offer arguments against the specialization of 
adjudication. Firstly, issues of IP law frequently arise in connection with disputes in 
other fields of law, especially competition, contract and fundamental rights law 
(Proposition 3). To set up clear rules delineating the jurisdiction of the specialized IP 
court might be difficult. Furthermore there is a strong ideological divide as to the 
goals of IP law and policy present both in the public as well as in the circles of IP 
practitioners (Proposition 6). The two well-known camps are those of the ‘pro-rights’ 
stance, pleading for a strong and broad protection of IP rights, and the ‘anti-rights’ 
stance, placing a stronger emphasis on a narrower scope of IP rights protection and 
the importance of the public domain.93 A specialized court might easily be caught in 
this cross-fire, thereby jeopardizing its reputation of impartiality, which is essential 
for any court. 
 
B. Implementation of federal IP policy 
1. Internal IP policy 
a. IP and internal trade policy 
In case one of the goals of a federation is the encouragement of trade between the 
federation’s subunits and the creation of a common market, the territorial nature of IP 
rights can become an impediment to such a project, if their scope is restricted to the 
                                                 
92 The German patent court as well as the IP High Court of Japan for example have technical 
experts assisting the bench (Kley (2011) p. 29; Takenaka (2009) p. 387) 
93 Granstrand (1999) p. 36 
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subunit’s territory. The creation of a common market presupposes the possibility for 
all factors of production (goods, services, persons and capital), to move freely across 
the federation’s subunits. The free movement of goods can however be impaired if an 
IP owner enforces his IP right within one subunit against imported products from 
other subunits which infringe his IP right. The efforts of the federal government to 
abolish obstacles to trade at the subunits’ frontiers could therefore be frustrated by 
private parties who could partition the common market on the basis of enforcing their 
territorial IP rights.94 In respect of unregistered IP rights, harmonization of the 
subunits’ substantive IP laws would be sufficient to eliminate market obstacles. In 
case of copyright for example, the rules on counterfeiting might diverge between the 
subunits.95 Whereas a court in a subunit with strict counterfeiting rules might more 
readily prohibit the import of allegedly copyright infringing works from another 
subunit, the circulation of those works might not be hindered in subunits with less 
stringent counterfeiting rules. This would lead to the potentially infringing works 
being available in one part of the federation (subunits with less stringent 
counterfeiting rules) whereas the marketing of the very same works in other parts 
(those units with strict counterfeiting rules) would be banned. The pan-federal market 
would therefore be split between subunits with lenient counterfeiting rules on the one 
hand and those with strict counterfeiting rules on the other hand. If the rules of all 
subunits were the same, there would thus be no partitioning of the market. 
In case of registered rights, the creation of federation-wide rights would be necessary 
however to overcome partitioning of the market due to the territorial nature of the 
grant.96 If an inventor, I, were to be granted a patent in subunit A, this would not 
impede anyone to reproduce and sell I’s patented technology in all other subunits 
except A. In A however, I could file a lawsuit to stop the sale of infringing goods 
imported from other subunits. Similarly, I could get a patent in each subunit, thereby 
obtaining a monopoly for his invention in each subunit separately. He could then 
charge in subunit A 15 Euros for his invention and, because the inhabitants of subunit 
                                                 
94 MacQueen (2008) p. 801 
95 Example drawn from Weiler, Joseph H. H. and Kocjan, Martina, “NYU The Law of the 
European Union Teaching Material, Unit 12, The Internal Market: Intellectual Property” 
(2004), p. 1 
96 Dinwoodie (2001) p. 54 
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B are poorer than those in A, charge 3 Euros in B. On the basis of his patent rights he 
could inhibit parallel importers from buying I’s invention in B and reselling it in A, 
thereby taking advantage of the price differentials.97 These market-partitioning 
exercises of IP rights could only be fully avoided if registered IP rights were granted 
for the federal territory as a whole. The alternative of having free market rules 
overriding territorial IP protection would not seem to be viable, because it could 
empty IP rights to such an extent, that their incentive function would be lost.98 
 
b. IP and economic growth 
Another goal of federal IP policy could be to increase the value of national IP rights in 
order to improve the competitive position of the domestic IP producing industry. As 
with any property right, the prospects of effective enforcement of IP rights through 
the domestic court system should increase the value of obtaining and holding these 
rights. The production and acquisition of IP rights should therefore increase if the 
judicial enforcement of IP rights became more reliable.99 Additionally, IP owners 
might reduce their own expenditures on protection mechanisms for their IP if they can 
rely on the court system to protect their rights.100 Thereby IP owners would free 
resources, which in turn could be used for additional investment in research and 
development or other projects improving their competitive position. As result one 
could expect a boost on innovation and technological development with its positive 
impact on overall economic welfare. 
 
                                                 
97 MacQueen (2008) p. 801 
98 Reindl (1996) p. 831 
99 With the establishment of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit patent protection 
in the US shifted in favor of patentees. Patent owners were thus more readily able to enforce 
their patents. As a result the value of US patents has increased significantly (Wagner & 
Petherbridge (2004) p. 1116) 
100 This conclusion is drawn from the classic discussion about the optimum level of protection 
of conventional physical objects of property (Landes & Posner (2003) p. 18 f., 22 f.) 
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2. External IP policy 
a. IP and international organizations 
The international organization dealing with the global protection of IP rights is the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). This UN agency administers a 
range of international treaties in the field of IP. A very relevant part of these treaties 
for international IP practice consist of those conventions centralizing the process for 
filing applications for registration of trademarks (Madrid System), patents (Patent 
Cooperation System), designs (Hague System) and appellations of origin (Lisbon 
System) of the signatory states. Even though these treaties do not create substantive 
international IP rights, they facilitate the process of receiving protection in several 
different jurisdictions simultaneously. WIPO is also a international forum of 
discussion, research and development of IP law with the aim of enhancing 
international economic, social and cultural development.101 A state participating in 
WIPO’s projects that has a specialized IP court could more readily forward new 
developments of the international IP scene to the realities of domestic IP litigation via 
a specialized court. At the same time domestic developments in IP litigation might be 
more easily observed when there exists one specialized court, which may in turn 
provide important information to WIPO about IP practice in the signatory states. 
 
Relatively recently the World Trade Organization (WTO) has joined WIPO as 
previously sole player in the landscape of international organizations dealing with IP 
matters. After the adoption of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights including Trade in Counterfeited Goods (TRIPS) at the GATT 
Uruguay Round, the WTO is now in charge with the administration of this 
international IP treaty.102 As global trade in IP protected products has dramatically 
increased over the last two decades,103 IP now also has a priority in states’ 
international trade policy. 
b. IP and international trade 
                                                 
101 Self-proclaimed WIPO goal, available at http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/ [last visited 
September 23, 2012] 
102 MacQueen (2008) p. 560 
103 Dreyfuss (3), p. 1 f. 
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The protection of IP rights is not only desirable for stimulating the production of IP 
within an economy and thereby stimulating economic growth internally. By now, IP 
has also become a major component of international commerce.104 External IP policy 
is therefore an important part of a political entity’s external trade policy. The most 
important current international agreement on intellectual property, the TRIPS 
agreement, was concluded within the WTO framework, indicating the relevance of IP 
for international trade.  
In WTO negotiation rounds, several issues related to trade are negotiated 
simultaneously, IP only being one topic among several others on the agenda.105 Each 
negotiating member will pursue its own trade interest during such rounds and the 
result of the round will be a tradeoff between different competing interests. Especially 
if a country is an IP net exporter, the government will be interested that the domestic 
industries IP rights are protected abroad.106 A specialized IP court could be considered 
as a sign that a WTO member is taking its obligation of domestic as well as foreign IP 
protection very seriously. This may firstly have an exemplary function and encourage 
or compel other WTO members to follow suit and establish an IP court within their 
own judicial system. Thereby overall international IP protection might increase, 
leading to an increased stability for IP trade and encouraging international business in 
IP. Alternatively, in case other members cannot or do not want to establish an IP 
judiciary in their domestic system, a member with a specialized IP court might still 
have a stronger bargaining position in negotiation rounds. As a member with an IP 
court shows commitment to IP protection in trade, it might be easier for such a 
member to obtain concessions in other negotiation areas related to trade, e.g. in the 
field of investment or tariffs.107 
 
                                                 
104 Dinwoodie (2001) p.42  
105 Dinwoodie,(2001) p. 59 
106“As a practical matter, willingness to adhere to the multilateral intellectual property treaties 
has often been determined by balance of trade considerations.” (Dinwoodie (2001) p. 43) 
107 This was for example the case when TRIPS was negotiated: developing countries had no 
interest in increasing IP protection because it yielded no benefit to them. They became 
signatories to TRIPS nonetheless, because developed countries offered agricultural tariff 
concessions in return. (Guzman (2000) p. 22) 
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3. Conclusion on the desirability of specialized IP adjudication in light of 
the propositions – A public perspective 
From an IP policy perspective, the setting up of a specialized IP court might be 
beneficial to internal and external trade as well as for economic growth. Firstly, a 
uniform interpretation of federal legislation harmonizing or unifying IP law is 
important to ensure that the obstacles to trade previously caused by diverging national 
IP laws are in fact abolished (Proposition 10). Otherwise obstacles to internal trade 
might continue to exist due to diverging interpretations of the federal harmonizing 
legislation by the sub-unit courts. A single specialized federal court might bring the 
necessary uniform interpretation to give full effect to federal IP legislation. The 
prospect of having IP disputes adjudicated by a specialized courts might furthermore 
increase the value of IP and thereby boost the national economy.108 
Furthermore all WTO Members have signed an international IP treaty, namely the 
TRIPS (Proposition 11). A specialized IP court might facilitate for a WTO Member to 
honor its obligations under the agreement and might have a positive effect on external 
trade.109 
IV. The case for specialized European adjudication in 
the field of intellectual property 
A. The current situation of IP protection in the EU 
The current situation of intellectual property protection within the European Union is 
governed by both, the laws of the Member States and European Union law. In the 
case of patents it is additionally governed by the rules of the European Patent 
Convention. The type of interplay between these jurisdictional levels, be it in respect 
of the administrative application and registration procedures or in respect of judicial 
                                                 
108 The setting up of the IP High Court of Japan is named as one of the factors which pulled 
Japan out of the 1990s crisis by increasing the value of Japanese IP rights and thereby 
creating economic growth (Takenaka (2009) p. 397) 
109 The Thai Central Intellectual Property Court and International Trade Court was set up to 
better comply with the obligations imposed by TRIPS and as restructuring policy to spur 
economic growth (Antons (2005) p. 289) 
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enforcement, is different depending on the type of intellectual property. Harmonizing 
or unifying European legislation in the field of IP has only been adopted by the Union 
legislator where it was deemed to be necessary to further the achievement of the 
internal market.110 The legal landscape of IP protection in Europe is therefore not a 
harmonious, uniform picture but highly scattered and complex. The best attempt to 
give an overview is therefore to proceed by addressing each type of IP on its own.111 
 
1. Copyright 
Copyright protection in the European Union is still governed for the most part by 
national copyright statutes.112 European Directives harmonizing national copyright 
laws have been enacted mainly for different types of works in the field of new 
technologies separately, to ensure an increased level of copyright protection. This 
legislative action was deemed necessary in view of the rise of the Internet age, where 
perfect copies infringing IP protected works could suddenly be produced 
instantaneously in unlimited quantities at no cost and distributed with the same ease 
around the globe.113 Whereas the purported reason for the enactment of these 
directives was the furthering of the internal market, their main purpose seems to be a 
protection of the competitiveness of the European IT industry against the threat of 
piracy.114 The enforcement of copyrights lies therefore in the hands of Member State 
courts. The Court of Justice of the European Union will only exercise jurisdiction in 
the field of copyright if a national court refers a preliminary question to it on the basis 
of Article 267 TFEU.115 
                                                 
110 The legal basis for the Trade Mark and Designs Directive was Article 114 TFEU (ex-
Article 95 TEC) and for the Community Trade Mark and Designs Regulations Article 352 
TFEU (ex-Article 308 TEC) (albeit this is a general legislative competence, the preambles in 
both Regulations refer to the political aim of furthering the internal market by the creation of 
Union wide rights). 
111 Ullrich (2010) p. 10 
112 Ullrich (2010) p. 10 
113 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on 
the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society. 
114 Ullrich (2010) p. 11 
115 Ibid p. 13 
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2. Trademarks and Designs 
a. Substantive law 
The system of European trademark protection has a parallel structure. On the one 
hand there exist trademark systems separately in each Member State, each with its 
national trademark laws and trademark offices registering trademark rights, which are 
restricted to the Member State’s territory.116 Substantive national trademark laws have 
however been harmonized by a European Trademark Directive.117 At the same time 
the Community Trademark System qua European law has been created, making 
available a trademark right with validity in the territory of the entire European 
Union.118 The Registry for Community Trademarks is administered by the Office for 
Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM), located in Alicante, Spain.  
The system of European design protection is a mirror image of the system for 
trademark protection. The former was adopted on the basis of the success of the 
latter.119 There exist thus national territorial design rights, governed by national 
design laws which have been harmonized by a European Directive.120 At the same 
time there exists a unitary European-wide design right, created by European 
Regulation in 2002.121 The registry for Community designs is also administered by 
OHIM. 
 
b. Judicial enforcement in the two-level system of IP protection 
For harmonized national trademark and design rights, disputes relating to their 
acquisition, registration, exploitation, infringement and validity are adjudicated by 
                                                 
116 With the exception of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg that already pooled their 
national systems in a Benelux system in the 1960s. 
117 Council Directive (EC) No. 89/104/ of 21 December 1988 
118 Council Regulation (EC) No. 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community Trade Mark, 
as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No. 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘CTMR’) 
119 Ullrich (2010) p.19 
120 Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1998 on 
the legal protection of designs 
121 Council Regulation (EC) No. 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community Designs 
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specialized administrative agencies (e.g. appellate bodies within the national 
trademark offices), specialized courts and generalist national courts, depending on the 
design of the national systems. As with copyright, issues of national trademark and 
design rights will reach the Union judicature only via a preliminary reference 
procedure. Therefore the interpretation of the harmonized national trademark and 
design laws will primarily lie in the hands of national courts.122 
 
Disputes relating to Community trademarks and designs have two different paths of 
judicial procedure depending on whether the dispute relates to an administrative issue 
(application, registration and revocation procedure before OHIM) or an issue of 
private law (exploitation, infringement, validity) of the rights.  
In the realm of administrative issues relating to the grant of a Community trademark 
or design right, there are two adjudicative instances within OHIM. The three first 
instance divisions where administrative decisions can be appealed are the 
Examination, Opposition and Cancellation Divisions. The Examination Division is 
responsible for reexamining rejections of applications by the Offices’ examiners. The 
Opposition Division deals with inter partes proceedings where an earlier right owner 
can challenge a new application. The Cancellation division is responsible for 
revocation and invalidity proceedings against registered Community trademarks. 
Decisions from the three first instances can be reviewed by the Boards of Appeal, a 
quasi-judicial independent appellate body within the Office. The decisions of the 
Boards of Appeal can be appealed in turn to the General Court.123 The last instance to 
appeal to will be the CJEU. The administrative procedural safeguards for Community 
trademark and design rights are therefore provided at EU level by both OHIM and the 
European courts. 
                                                 
122 Nonetheless, national courts may be influenced by the CJEU’s case law on the Community 
trademark and design rights, since many provision of the respective Directives and Regulation 
are the same (Ullrich (2010) p. 24) 
123 note that the party constellation changes before the General Court. If an inter partes 
procedure before the OHIM Boards of Appeal was processed as X v Z and party Z loses and 
appeals to the General Court, the case before the General Court will be processed as Z v 
OHIM (X being only an interested third party to the case). 
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Civil protection of Community trademark and design rights against infringement is 
provided for by a system of Community trademark and design courts, in which each 
Member State has nominated a limited number of national first and second instance 
courts which will exclusively deal with matters of Community trademark and design 
rights. These courts will have jurisdiction to decide infringement claims as well as 
counterclaims relating to the validity of Community rights.124 Case law on issues of 
infringement and validity is therefore developed by national courts, albeit by a limited 
number of designated courts. Again, the CJEU will only provide guidelines in the area 
of civil protection of Community rights if so requested by national courts via Article 
267 TFEU.125 
3. Patent 
If European IP protection for trademark and design rights looked complex, it really 
gets messy once it comes to European patent protection. As with the other IP rights 
subject to registration, there exist firstly national patent systems, i.e. territorial patent 
rights and national patent laws in each Member State. Not all Member States 
possessed patent offices in the past however.126 A centralized European patent and 
application and registration process and an administrative agency were therefore set 
up by intergovernmental convention in 1973. All European Union Member States as 
well as other third states constitute the group of a total of currently 38 signatories to 
the European Patent Convention (EPC).127 The European Patent Office (EPO), which 
                                                 
124 Ullrich (2010) p. 24 
125 Maybe a matrix helps to keep track: 




National (administrative agencies, 
IP courts and generalist courts) 
National (IP and generalist courts) 
CTM and CDR European (OHIM, GC, CJEU) National (national Community 
trademark and design courts) 
 
126 Ullrich (2010) p. 26 
127 The signatories are all EU Member States as well as Albania, Switzerland, Croatia, 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Macedonia, Norway, Serbia, San Marino and Turkey 
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is located in Munich, administers the register of European Patents. A European Patent 
is, despite the name, not a unitary substantive right valid throughout the territory of all 
parties to the EPC however. It is rather a procedural tool, to receive simultaneously a 
bundle separate territorial patents valid in each of the signatory states designated by 
the applicant. European patent protection comes therefore à la carte. 128 The applicant 
can pick and choose for which national territories he wants protection. There is little 
European Union law on patents, mainly because the existence of the EPC and the 
harmonizing effects on national law the EPC has had, have inhibited Union action in 
this field.129 
All issues regarding protection of national patent rights granted by national agencies 
are in the hands of the national administration and judiciary. When it comes to 
European Patents there is again a pre-grant/post-grant split. As the application 
procedure is unified and administered by the EPO, a dispute resolution mechanism 
relating to refusals of patent applications, oppositions to applications, registration and 
revocation i.e. administrative protection, is provided for within the EPO.130 Post-grant 
civil protection against infringement is split however along national borders, each 
national court system having jurisdiction over civil litigation in patent cases only in 
respect of the own national patent right, which forms part of the European Patent 
bundle of rights.131 Administrative protection relating to European Patents it is thus in 
the hands of an international organization encompassing a larger number of states 
than the Member States of the European Union. Civil enforcement of European 
Patents is however split between the national courts of those states listed in the 
individual European Patent grant. 
 
B. Inefficiencies in European IP litigation 
The current system of European IP protection still adheres mainly to the principle of 
national-territorial legal protection of IP. As the free flow of goods, the transfer of 
technology and the enhancement of e-commerce is furthered within the EU internal 
                                                 
128 Ullrich (2010) p. 26 




market, and the dissemination of copyrighted materials over the internet has exploded, 
the potential for cross-border infringement and the number of cross-border IP disputes 
have increased rapidly over the last decades. Due to the territorial limitation of IP 
protection in a world where the operation of IP is increasingly international, the 
litigation of cross-border IP disputes in the EU has become costly, complex and 
entails a lot of uncertainty for the litigants.132 
 
1. IP litigation under the Brussels I Regulation 
In an ideal European IP litigation system, an IP owner who wants to bring a court 
action to contain EU cross-border infringement of his right by several undertakings 
against infringing actions committed in several Member States, would be able to do so 
by bringing one single action in one court covering all defendants and all infringing 
conduct.133 The only currently existing legislative instrument with the potential of 
enabling such an efficient form of IP litigation would be the Brussels I Regulation,134 
which implements a uniform set of international private law rules for all EU Member 
States determining the appropriate forum litigens for disputes relating to civil and 
commercial matters. The default jurisdictional rule of the Brussels I Regulation is 
based on the ‘actor sequitur forum rei’ principle, according to which civil actions are 
to be filed at the courts of the defendant’s domicile, no matter where infringement 
took place.135 An IP owner would thus have to bring an action in the Member State 
where the alleged infringer is domiciled. If there were several alleged infringers, 
Article 6 (1) of the Regulation would potentially allow the plaintiff to consolidate his 
claims in one action against all infringers.136 The plaintiff could bring the action in the 
domicile of any of the defendants, “provided the claims are so closely connected that 
it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable 
                                                 
132 MacQueen (2008) p. 921 
133 Nuyts (2008) p. 9 
134 Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 Brussels Regulation on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters. 
135 Article 2 Brussels I Regulation; Nuyts (2008) p. 6 
136 Forum connexitatis rule; Nuyts (2008) p. 8 
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judgments resulting from separate proceedings”.137 Arguably, one could imagine that 
if a plaintiff has protected his IP across the EU with several parallel rights, prime 
example being a European patent, and a group of economically linked defendants 
engages in identical infringing actions in different Member States, there would be 
such a “sufficiently close connection” to file a consolidated action. The CJEU was of 
a different opinion however, and held in the Roche case that, in the case of a European 
patent, as it breaks down into separate national patents, the legal and factual situation 
was different and would not lead to irreconcilable judgments.138 Article 6 (1) of the 
Regulation as interpreted by the CJEU does therefore not enable an IP owner holding 
a number of parallel national IP rights to enforce them in a uniform way against 
parallel infringements.139 He will have to file several lawsuits in each of the 
defendants’ fora separately. 
In contrast to IP infringement actions, which follow the general rule of the Brussels I 
regulation, the Regulation has a special jurisdictional rule in the case of disputes 
involving issues of administrative nature in relation to registered IP, such as the 
registration, revocation and validity of the IP right. Article 22 (4) of the regulation 
sets out that the courts of the Member State in which the IP right has been registered 
have exclusive jurisdiction in these cases. In case an IP owner sues a defendant for 
infringing several of his parallel IP rights by the defendants’ cross-border conduct, the 
defendant will often plead that the parallel rights are invalid in response. The validity 
of each right will then have to be checked separately by the courts of the state where 
the right has been registered.140 As a result, it can happen that a court in one Member 
State finds a national IP right which is part of a net of multiple parallel rights valid, 
whereas a court in another Member State finds the mirror image of the same right 
invalid. An IP holder who was aiming at a pan-European protection for his invention 
by patenting it in the same fashion in different jurisdictions, will be faced with a 
‘Swiss-cheese’-type of protection, depending on the interpretation of the national 
                                                 
137 Article 6 (1) Brussels I Regulation 
138 Case C-539/03 Roche v Primus paragraph 31 
139 Nuyts (2008) p. 33 
140 Case C-4/03 Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik (GAT) mbH & Co. KG v Lamellen und 
Kupplungsbau (LuK) Beteiligungs KG paragraph 31 
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courts.141 The piecemeal approach imposed by the Brussels I Regulation on IP right 
holders is thus far from an ideal, efficient system of cross-border European IP 
litigation. 
Additionally, defendants in cross-border IP disputes have found their own methods of 
using and abusing the Brussels I framework to serve their interests. The mirror image 
of an IP infringement action by an IP holder is an action requiring a negative 
declaration by the defendant, i.e. a declaration of non-infringement.142 When faced 
with the threat of an infringement action by an IP holder in a cross-border situation, IP 
defendants can file an action for declaration of non-infringement before the IP holder 
has filed his infringement action. Through the lis pendens rule of the Brussels I 
Regulation143, the court before which the IP holder subsequently files his infringement 
action will have to stay its proceedings until the court seized with the negative action 
of the alleged infringer has decided upon the case. If the alleged infringer files his 
action within a jurisdiction with particularly slow courts, he may frustrate any even 
legitimate infringement claim by the IP holder.144 Such abusive forum shopping by 
potential defendants in cross-border IP disputes weakens the position of European 
right holders in cross-border litigation even further. 
 
                                                 
141 “For a recent example of this, see the judgment of 17 November 2009 from the High Court 
of Justice, Court of Appeal (Civil Division), in Leo Pharma A/S and Leo Laboratories Ltd. v. 
Sandoz Ltd., [2009] EWCA Civ 1118, where a British patent for calcipotriol monohydrate 
was upheld as valid. In the judgment, Lord Justice Jacob noted: ‘We have reached the same 
result as that in Holland at first instance (where the argument was in part different). The 
Bundespatentgericht has gone the other way – but working on different prior art, prior art 
which Sandoz in this country abandoned. Different results in different countries based on 
different cases is, of course explicable. It is an unfortunate state of affairs, curable only by a 
single European Patent Court.’” (Petersen & Schovsbo (2011) p. 8) 
142 Nuyts (2008) p. 21 
143 Article 27 Brussels I Regulation 
144 This is how the expression of the ‘Italian torpedo’ to denominate these practices was born. 
Italian and Belgian courts are the most popular to file these actions. (Nuyts (2008) p. 21 f.) 
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2. Litigation in the Community trademark and design courts 
As the problems of European cross-border IP litigation arise mainly from the 
territoriality principle governing IP rights in the Member States, one might expect a 
friendlier picture on litigation in the case of unitary substantive Community IP rights 
covering the Union’s territory as a whole. According to the Community Trademark 
Regulation, Community Trademark Courts, i.e. a limited number of designated 
specialized national courts, have exclusive jurisdiction over infringement and validity 
actions involving a Community trademark.145 The same is true for the system of 
Community design courts.146 
When it comes to litigating the infringement of a Community trademark (CTM) or 
design right (CD), the CTMR and CDR follow the scheme of the Brussels I 
regulation.147 The CTM or CD owner has to file an action for infringement or 
invalidity at the place where the defendant is domiciled. Community trademark and 
design courts have explicit jurisdiction over all infringing acts occurring anywhere in 
the territory of the European Union.148 Nevertheless, a CTM or CD owner might be 
denied uniform enforcement protection of his right in cross-border infringement 
cases, because the remedies are, with the exception of injunctive relief, to be 
determined according to the international private law rules of the forum. Now, 
according to the Rome II Regulation which provides for the applicable substantive 
law in cross-border IP infringement cases, remedies for infringement of CTMs or CDs 
are determined according to the law of the place where the damage took place, as long 
as there are no provisions in the CTMR or CDR.149 As the remedies are determined by 
the laws of the place where the infringement occurred, a CTM or CD owner might 
therefore be accorded different degrees and types of protective measures, depending 
in which Member State infringement took place.150 The bottom line is that even in the 
                                                 
145 Article 97 CTMR 
146 Article 81 CDR 
147 Article 94 CTMR, Article 79 CDR 
148 Article 98 CTMR, Article 83 CDR 
149 Article 8 (2) Regulation  (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II Regulation) 
150 Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law Munich - Study on the 
Overall Functioning of the European Trade Mark System (February 15, 2011) available at: 
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case of unitary Union rights, enforcement will not be uniform but will yield a 
patchwork protection along national borders. 
 
C. European IP policy  
1. Free trade and competition in the Internal Market 
The creation of a highly competitive internal market akin to a national market, in 
which the free movement of factors of production is guaranteed, has always been one 
of the most important political aims of the European Union.151 The existence of IP 
rights which are restricted to the territories and laws of the Member States of the EU 
present however obstacles to the free movement of goods and services and are 
therefore a hindrance for the completion of the internal market.152 Accordingly, 
legislative instruments which harmonized national IP laws and created Union-wide IP 
rights were enacted for reasons of removing obstacles to the free movement of goods 
and services.153 Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and Article 118 TFEU 
thereof, there is now also a specific legal basis empowering the Union to create 
Union-wide IP rights “in the context of the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market”. 
Also in the area of competition law and policy, IP rights are increasingly becoming an 
issue, as evidenced by the case law of the European Courts relating to abuse of a 
dominant market position under Article 102 TFEU. The CJEU has developed in the 
                                                                                                                                            
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/tm/20110308_allensbach-study_en.pdf [last 
visited October 14, 2012] p. 160 
151 This political aim is currently set out in Article 1 (3) TEU 
152 See section III.B.1.a. 
153 The legal basis for the Trade Mark and Designs Directive was Article 114 TFEU (ex-
Article 95 TEC) and for the Community Trade Mark and Designs Regulations Article 352 
TFEU (ex-Article 308 TEC) (albeit this is a general legislative competence, the preambles in 
both Regulations refer to the political aim of furthering the internal market by the creation of 
Union wide rights) 
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last two decades a test to determine whether a refusal to license IP can be classified as 
an anticompetitive behavior caught under the provisions of EU competition rules.154 
The current situation of IP protection in the EU is therefore a potential impediment to 
the functioning of the internal market and can work to the detriment of competition in 
the internal market. Furthermore, if the necessary political will existed, there would 
be the possibility, in the form of enabling legal bases in the Treaties (Article 118 
TFEU), for the EU legislator to remedy the market fractioning situation of IP rights 
protection given at the moment. 
2. International trade and international organizations 
The EU is a member to the WTO since 1995 and accordingly also a signatory to the 
TRIPS agreement. Additionally, with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the 
Union’s competences in the field of the common commercial policy have been extend 
explicitly to cover the commercial aspects of intellectual property.155 IP is therefore 
an important item on the EU’s external trade agenda.  
It is not only in the context of the WTO that the Union has taken external action in 
relation to IP protection. The EU is also an active participant in other international 
organizations dealing with international IP policy, most notably in the World 
Intellectual Property Organization.156  
 
D. Previous proposals for European IP courts 
 
                                                 
154 The following test was developed: (1) the requested IP had to be ‘indispensable’ to 
compete,  (2) it had to prevent the emergence of a new product, (3) had to be of such a nature 
as to exclude ‘any’ competition on a secondary market and (4) the refusal could not be 
objectively justified. Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) 
and Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission of the European 
Communities [1995]; Case C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH v NDC Health [2004]; applied by the 
GC in Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp v. Commission of the European Communities [2007] 
155 Article 207 TFEU 
156 Nuyts (2008) p. 2 
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1. Rise and fall (and resurrection?) of the European and European 
Union Patent Court proposal 
Considering the difficulty of uniform judicial enforcement of European patents across 
several jurisdictions, the community of European patent holders has persistently 
pushed for the establishment of a European patent judiciary.157 The latest proposal of 
establishing a European Patent judiciary was tabled in the Council of the European 
Union in 2009 together with a legislative proposal for the creation of a uniform 
Community patent right.158 The envisaged European and European Union Patent 
Court (EEUPC) was to be set up as a supranational court by international agreement 
between the Member States of the European Union and the remaining states that are 
members to the EPC. The EEUPC would have had a first instance court consisting of 
one central division and several decentralized divisions, as well as an appeals 
instance. The appeal court would have been at the same time the final instance of the 
European patent judiciary. The EEUPC would have had exclusive jurisdiction over all 
inter partes infringement and validity cases involving European patents and the 
Community patent to-be. It would have absorbed and replaced the jurisdiction of 
national courts in this area.159 In cases involving EU law, the agreement would have 
provided for the possibility to refer preliminary references to the CJEU.160 
When the proposal for the EEUPC was submitted to the CJEU for an opinion on the 
compatibility of the international agreement with EU law, the Court found it to be 
incompatible with the European Treaties.161 The main objection the Court had to the 
proposed EEUPC was its exclusive jurisdiction in the field of patent law, which 
entailed depriving the national courts of the EU Member States of their jurisdiction to 
adjudicate European patent disputes between private parties.162 With the same token, 
national courts would have been deprived to apply and enforce EU law to issues 
                                                 
157 Ullrich (2010) p. 32 
158 Visscher (2012) p. 14 
159 Ullrich (2010) p. 36 
160 in the 2012 working document the relevant provision is Article 14 b, available at: 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st14/st14268.en12.pdf [last visited October 14, 
2012] 
161 Opinion 1/09 of 8 March 2011 
162 Visscher (2012) p. 15 f. 
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arising in connection with these patent disputes, such as issues of EU competition 
law, market freedoms or EU fundamental rights. Consequently, national courts would 
have been deprived of the opportunity to refer preliminary questions in these cases to 
the CEJU.  As a result, the courts of the Member States together with the CJEU, 
would have be prevented from fulfilling their common function under Article 19 
TEU, i.e. they would be prevented to fulfill their obligation to jointly ensure the effet 
utile of European Union law.163  
The EEUPC proposal has not yet been abandoned, but so far no further amended 
proposal seems to have found sufficient political consensus to have reached the stage 
of having been voted upon in the European Parliament.164, 165 
 
                                                 
163 “Consequently, the envisaged agreement, by conferring on an international court which is 
outside the institutional and judicial framework of the European Union an exclusive 
jurisdiction to hear a significant number of actions brought by individuals in the field of the 
Community patent and to interpret and apply European Union law in that field, would deprive 
courts of Member States of their powers in relation to the interpretation and application of 
European Union law and the Court of its powers to reply, by preliminary ruling, to questions 
referred by those courts and, consequently, would alter the essential character of the powers 
which the Treaties confer on the institutions of the European Union and on the Member States 
and which are indispensable to the preservation of the very nature of European Union law“ 
(paragraph 89 of Opinion 1/09) 
164 The newest document of a Draft Agreement on a Unified Patent Court and draft Statute 
has been published by the Council on September 27, 2012 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st14/st14268.en12.pdf [last visited October 14, 
2012] 
165 Addendum 4 January 2013: On 11 December 2012 the European Parliament approved the 
“unitary patent package”, which contains, next to the rules for the unitary patent right and 
language regime, an international agreement covering the establishment of a unified patent 
court (press release of 11 December 2012 of the European Parliament available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+IM-
PRESS+20121210IPR04506+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN [last visited 4 January 
2013]). The unified patent court was however only approved by non-legislative resolution – 
the date of signature of the agreement is set for 8 February 2013 (see press release of 11 
December 2012 of the European Patent Office available at http://www.epo.org/news-
issues/news/2012/20121211.html [last visited 4 January 2013]). 
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2. ‘Upgrading’ the OHIM Boards of Appeal to a European trade mark 
court 
The Boards of Appeal of OHIM are considered a department within the agency with a 
special status because its members are independent in their decisions.166 This 
independence places the Boards of Appeal somehow between an administrative 
adjudicative body and a judicial body. It is entrusted with providing legal safeguards 
in the application and registration process for Community trademarks and design 
rights. Furthermore its decisions are appealed to the General Court. It does not take a 
quantum leap in thought167 to imagine OHIM’s Boards of Appeal being transformed 
into a European Union Trademark Court forming part of the European Union judicial 
architecture.168 Additionally, it could act as last instance of the Community trademark 
and design courts system, thereby uniting at the top of the hierarchy both, 
administrative as well as civil law protection of Community trademark and design 
rights.169 To ensure that the body of case law on the two existing Community IP rights 
does not develop in isolation from the rest of European Union law, appeals could be 
allowed in special cases to the General Court or even directly to the CJEU. 
 
E. The case for a European Union Intellectual Property Court 
1. Legal basis in the Treaties 
In principle there exist no ‘legal obstacles’ to the creation of a European Union IP 
Court. The Treaties provide the Union legislator with the competence to set up 
specialized courts attached to the GC.170 A first example of such a specialized court is 
                                                 
166 Article 136 (4) CTMR 
167 In political reality it would take a quantum leap, tough. 
168 e.g. discussed in Micara (2009) p. 222 ff. 
169 The European Trademark Court would then have a position akin to the X Senate in the 
German Supreme Court, which hears at last instance appeals from generalist courts in 
infringement cases as well as appeals from the German patent court which acts as control 
instance for the German patent and trademark office (Meier-Beck (2011) p. 17 ff.) 
170 Article 257 TFEU 
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the Civil Service Tribunal, which was created in 2005 and with a limited jurisdiction 
to hear disputes between the European Union and its servants.171 
Furthermore the Lisbon Treaty provides for a specific IP jurisdictional legal basis, 
which allows the Union legislator confer upon the CJEU jurisdiction to hear disputes 
relating to the application of acts adopted on the basis of the Treaties which create 
European IP rights.172 This provision was most likely adopted in view of conferring 
jurisdiction upon the Court of Justice relating to the acquisition and protection of the 
yet-to-be-created Union Patent. It could also be used to broaden the jurisdictional 
competence of the Court relating to the Community Trade Mark. All in all the 
provision was kept vague to avoid anticipating a future Union IP law system still 
being in its embryonic state.173 Read in conjunction with Article 257 TFEU, also a 
specialized Union court could hear cases relating to Union IP rights, if the IP 
jurisdictional competence is conferred upon the specialized court. 
As the creation of a specialized IP court seems to be possible in the framework of the 
EU Treaties, the decision of whether to establish a European Union IP Court is 
therefore not one of a technical legal nature, but one of policy choice. The 11 
propositions formulated in Section I will therefore serve as guidance to attempt to 
determine whether the setting up of a specialized European Union IP Court would be 
a desirable policy goal in the EU. 
 
2. The case for a European Union court specialized in IP: an 
assessment in light of the propositions 
Overall the case for a European Union specialized IP court seems quite strong. Firstly, 
it would be desirable to have a specialized IP court from a procedural perspective. On 
Member State level a lot of forum shopping that is detrimental to IP right holders can 
be observed (Proposition 1) and IP litigation is costly and time consuming because 
actions against several infringers cannot be consolidated and bundles of parallel IP 
rights have to be enforced separately. On the European level the number of Union IP 
rights applications is increasing and thereby also the numbers of appeals from OHIM 
                                                 
171 http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/T5_5230/ [last visited October 14, 2012] 
172 Article 262 TFEU 
173 Callies & Ruffert (2002) p. 2057 (Comment on Article 229a TEC by Bernhard Wegener)  
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to the GC is rising. At the moment, IP cases make up 30 per cent of the cases decided 
by the GC.174 A specialized Union IP court taking over these cases could significantly 
unburden the GC (Proposition 2). Furthermore access problems for small and medium 
size enterprises could be remedied establishing next to a central division several 
regional divisions of the Union IP court (Proposition 4).175 
Secondly, from a substantive perspective a Union IP court would be likely to bring 
about uniformity and clarity to substantive IP provisions through case law, which 
could provide greater legal certainty and guidance to IP litigants (Propositions 5 and 
6). Furthermore the quality of this case law could be improved by staffing the court 
with expert judges or experts who assist the judges, which would be more apt to deal 
with the technicalities of IP cases (Proposition 9). Overall, a European Union IP court 
would reasonably bear the promise to make European IP litigation more efficient and 
equitable. 
 
Nonetheless there are also arguments weakening the case for a European IP court. 
Firstly, as mentioned already in Section III.A.4., issues of IP law cannot always be 
easily separated from issues arising in other fields of law (Proposition 3). 
Furthermore there is an ideological quarrel between pro-rights and anti-rights 
supporters, which might politicize the institution of a European Union IP court 
(Proposition 8). Lastly, having a separate European Union IP court might put the 
coherence and uniformity of EU, the guarantee of which is one of the most important 
tasks of the CJEU, at risk (Proposition 7), because specialized courts tend to create 
their own legal environment around them with their own procedures, legal jargon and 
specialized group of practitioners. This could be partly remedied by allowing for 
appeals to the CJEU. Additionally, as European integration progresses, the uniformity 
of EU law as a whole might not have an as high priority anymore.176 
                                                 
174 GC statistics available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2012-
06/ra2011_statistiques_tribunal_en.pdf [last visited October 15, 2012] 
175 Probably the IP Court would not necessarily have to be located in Luxembourg, as the 
Luxembourg government already waived the claim of the seat of the OHIM Boards of Appeal 
if they were to become judicial panels within the meaning of Article 257 TFEU (ex-Article 
220 TEC) in its Declaration to the Nice Treaty. 
176 According to Grimm, the argument of unity of the law on the domestic level might play a 
less important role than on the European level, because the domestic court structure is more 
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From the perspective of the European Union policy maker, a Union specialized IP 
court would be prima facie desirable. Firstly, a uniform and possibly internal market-
friendly and competition-friendly interpretation of IP legislation would further the 
general goals of the EU (Proposition 10). Additionally, IP law is more and more 
becoming a subject of international law especially through TRIPS. Furthermore 
consolidation of IP law at the international level is also one of the main tasks of 
WIPO. A Union IP court would have a strong symbolic message in the international 
community, showing that the EU is taking IP protection very seriously (Proposition 
11). Nevertheless from the perspective of those Member States (especially Germany) 
who have a very sophisticated national judicial system for the enforcement of IP 
rights, a European Union IP court would have to be set up in such a way that it would 
be able to compete with national judicial systems. Otherwise a Union IP court would 
lack the necessary political support to be set up. 
V. Conclusion 
The current framework of European IP law and the realities of European IP litigation 
are highly complex and costly. They fail to provide IP right holders with adequate 
protection. But can a unified specialized IP court solve the problem? It appears that at 
least in comparison with the status quo, a Union IP court might yield efficiency gains 
to IP holders that need to rely on the judicial system to enforce their IP rights in cross-
border situations. 
Furthermore previous projects indicate that there exists the political will in favor of 
establishing a Union IP judiciary. The latest attempt has potentially failed because the 
Unified Patent Court was to be set up as international court outside the EU Treaty 
framework. A new attempt within the Treaty framework might finally bring success. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
elaborate and less based on cooperation (Grimm (2006) p. 281). The more akin the European 
legal system becomes to a national system, the less important the coherence and unity of EU 
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